In this paper, bounds to the rate-equivocation region for the general 3-receiver broadcast channel (BC) with degraded message sets, are presented for confidential messages to be kept secret from one of the receivers. This model is more general than the 2-receiver BCs with confidential messages with an external wiretapper, and the recently studied 3-receiver degraded BCs with confidential messages, since in the model studied in this paper, the conditions on the receivers are general and the wiretapper receives the common message. Wyner's code partitioning combined with double-binning is used to show the achievable rate tuples. Error probability analysis and equivocation calculation are also provided. The secure coding scheme is sufficient to provide security for the 3-receiver BC with 2 or 3 degraded message sets, for the scenarios: (i) 3 degraded message sets, where the first confidential message is sent to receivers 1 and 2 and the second confidential message is sent to receiver 1, (ii) 2 degraded message sets, where one confidential message is sent to receiver 1, and (iii) 2 degraded message sets, where one confidential message is sent to receivers 1 and 2. The proof for the outer bound is shown for the cases where receiver 1 is more capable than the wiretap receiver 3, for the first two scenarios. Under the condition that both receivers 1 and 2 are less noisy than the wiretap receiver 3, the inner and outer bounds coincide, giving the rate-equivocation region for (iii). In addition, a new outer bound for the general 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded messages is obtained.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications channels today are vulnerable to eavesdropping or wiretapping due to the open nature of the channel, making the characterization of transmission rates for secure and reliable communication for the physical layer an important issue. In the wireless broadcast medium, the model of the broadcast channel (BC) with confidential messages, which was studied by Csiszár and Körner [1] , is used to study simultaneously secure and reliable communication. The model in [1] is a generalization of the characterization of the wiretap channel by Wyner [2] . In [1] , a common message is sent to 2 receivers, while a confidential message is sent to one of the receivers and kept secret from the other. The secrecy level is determined by the equivocation rate, which is the entropy rate of the confidential message conditioned on the channel output at the eavesdropper or wiretapper.
The secrecy capacity region is defined as the set of transmission rates where the legitimate receiver decodes its confidential message while keeping the message secret from the wiretapper.
In more recent studies on the BC with confidential messages, Liu et al. [3] studied the scenario where there are 2 receivers and private messages are sent to each one and kept secret from the unintended receiver, while Xu et al. [4] looked at the same model in [3] but with a common message to both receivers. Then, Bagherikaram et al. [5] addressed the scenario where there are 2 receivers and one wiretapper, with confidential messages sent to the receivers. There have been recent studies where more than 2 receivers were considered. The authors in [6] and Ekrem and Ulukus in [7] independently studied the K-receiver BC with an external wiretapper. In [6] , the K-receiver BC with confidential messages sent to each receiver was studied, while in [7] , the same scenario was studied with the addition that each receiver also received a common message. Both used the degraded BC.
In another work, an achievable inner bound for the K-receiver BC with a common message sent to all receivers and a confidential message sent to each of the receivers to be kept secret from an external wiretapper was derived by Kobayashi et al. in [8] for general conditions on the receivers' and wiretapper's channels. Finally, Chia and El Gamal in [9] derived an achievable inner bound for the 3-receiver BC with a common message sent to all receivers and a private message sent to 2 of the receivers to be kept secret from the third.
Recently in [10] - [12] , Nair and El Gamal introduced the channel model of the 3-receiver BC with degraded message sets. In the general form of this model, a common message W 0 is sent to all of the receivers, denoted by the set R all , and the private messages, W i , W i−1 , . . . , W 1 , are sent to subsets of receivers R i ⊂ R i−1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ R 1 ⊂ R all . This model best describes a multimedia broadcasting system, in which the common message W 0 may represent the lowest quality transmission, and W 1 the next higher quality transmission, and so on. In [10] - [12] , three types of 3-receiver BCs with degraded message sets are studied: 1) 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets where W 0 is sent to all three receivers, W 1 is sent to receivers 1 and 2, and a second private message W 2 is sent to receiver 1;
2) 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 1) where the common message W 0 is sent to all three receivers and a private message W 1 is sent to the first receiver;
3) 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 2) where the common message W 0 is sent to all three receivers and a private message W 1 sent to receivers 1 and 2.
While preparing this paper for submission, the authors became aware that Nair and El Gamal in [12] used a different coding scheme for their achievability proof compared to their earlier work [10] , with detailed proofs in [11] . The added ingredient is rate splitting. However, a coding scheme with and without rate splitting is shown to give the same rate region in [12] . Based on this, in this paper, we shall not use rate splitting but base our achievability proof on the one in [10, 11] .
The objective of this paper is to study this model of the 3-receiver BC with degraded message sets of [10] , [11] with secrecy constraints. In particular, we characterize the transmission rates for the three types of 3-receiver BCs with degraded message sets from the model mentioned above where receiver 3 is a wiretapper. We note that the insights which this model of the 3-receiver BC with degraded message sets might bring are due to it being a more general model than the 2-or 3-receiver degraded BC with secrecy constraints. We also note that Chia and El Gamal in [9] have also studied the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 2) with receiver 3 being a wiretapper, but using a different coding scheme.
For the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets and 2 degraded message sets (Type 1) without secrecy constraints, the inner capacity bound in [10] , [11] is achievable by superposition coding, Marton's achievability technique [13] and indirect decoding, where the receivers decoding the common message only do so via satellite codewords instead of cloud centers. For the general 3-receiver BC with degraded message sets, an outer bound to the capacity region was given in [10, 11] only for the general 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Types 1 and 2). For the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 2), the inner and outer bounds coincide under the condition that first and second receivers are less noisy than the third receiver.
In our earlier work [14] , we had studied the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 1), with the third receiver regarded as a wiretapper from which the private message is to be kept secret. In this paper, we consider the more general model of the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets where the third receiver is a wiretapper from which the private messages W 1 , W 2 are to be kept secret. As the wiretapper in this case also decodes the common message, the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets with the third receiver a wiretapper describes a more general scenario than three types of scenarios: the 2-receiver BCs with an external wiretapper of [5] , the 2-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets and an external wiretapper, and the 3-receiver degraded BCs with an external wiretapper by the virtue of the general conditions on the receivers.
In our secure coding scheme, we shall use a combination of the code partitioning of Wyner [2] and doublebinning of Liu et al. [3] to show the achievability of an inner bound to the rate-equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets. Error probability analysis and equivocation calculation for the private messages are provided. The proposed secure coding scheme is shown to be sufficient for providing security for both the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets and the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 1). We obtain outer bounds to the rate-equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets for the case where receiver 1 is more capable than the wiretap receiver 3, a weaker condition than the condition that receiver 3 is a degraded version of receiver 1 or the condition that receiver 1 is less noisy than the wiretap receiver 3 [15] . By removing the security constraints, we further obtain an outer bound to the capacity region for the general 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets, which is not found in [10] - [12] . This is because the condition that receiver 1 is more capable than receiver 3 applies only to the case where we have secrecy constraints. Then, we show that the outer bounds to the rate-equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets reduce to the outer bounds to the rate-equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 1), if receiver 1 is more capable than the wiretap receiver 3. Finally, we show that, under the condition that the first and second receivers are less noisy than the third receiver, respectively (still a more general condition than degradedness [15] ), the inner and outer bounds to the rate-equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets reduce to the region for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 2). This rate-equivocation region we obtain is furthermore a special case of the variant of the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 2) studied in [9] with a different coding scheme. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the model for the 3-receiver BC with degraded message sets. In Section III, we state our main results, the bounds to the rate-equivocation region. In Section IV, we show achievability of the inner bound to the rate-equivocation region using our secure coding scheme for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets and the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 1) and show error probability analysis and equivocation calculation for the private messages. We show that the coding scheme provides security for both types of channel. In Section V, we show the proof of the outer bounds for the three types of the 3-receiver BC with degraded message sets. Lastly, we give conclusions in Section VI.
II. THE 3-RECEIVER BC WITH DEGRADED MESSAGE SETS
In this paper, we use the uppercase letter to denote a random variable (e.g., X) and the lowercase letter for its realization (e.g., x). The alphabet set of X is denoted by X so that x ∈ X . We denote a sequence of n random variables by X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) with its realization x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n if x i ∈ X for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Furthermore, we define the subsequences of X as
The discrete memoryless BC with 3 receivers has an input random sequence, X, and 3 output random sequences at the receivers, denoted respectively by Y 1 , Y 2 and Y 3 , all of length n, with x ∈ X n , y 1 ∈ Y n 1 , y 2 ∈ Y n 2 , and y 3 ∈ Y n 3 . The conditional distribution for n uses of the channel is given by
A (2 nR0 , 2 nR1 , 2 nR2 , n)-code for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets, as depicted in Figure 1 , consists of the following parameters:
, (common message set)
, (private message set),
In particular, we have
1 ), and g 3 (Y 3 ) =Ŵ (3) 0 , where the notation "(·)" highlights that the decoded messages are estimates, with the error probability
In this setup, Y 3 is the wiretapper, and the secrecy level of the messages sent are as follows:
1) For W 1 sent to users 1 and 2, the secrecy level is defined by the equivocation rate
For W 2 sent to user 1, the secrecy level is defined by the equivocation rate
3) The combined message (W 1 , W 2 ) sent to user 1 has secrecy level defined by the equivocation rate
In addition, a (2 nR0 , 2 nR1 , n)-code for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 1), as shown in 
nR0 , (common message set)
0 , and
0 , with the error probability
0 ,Ŵ
1 n H(W 1 |Y 3 ). Finally, a (2 nR0 , 2 nR1 , n)-code for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 2), as shown in Figure 3 , consists of the parameters:
Encoder Channel p(y 1 ,y 2 ,y 3 |x)
(2) Fig. 3 . The 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 2) and confidential message.
We have
1 ), and
0 , and error probability
1 ,Ŵ
The secrecy level of the message W 1 sent to users 1 and 2 is defined by the equivocation rate
III. BOUNDS TO THE RATE-EQUIVOCATION REGION

A. The 3-Receiver BC with 3 Degraded Message Sets
For the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets, the rate tuple (R 0 , R 1 , R 1e , R 2 , R 2e ) is said to be achievable if for any η, ǫ 1 ,ǫ 1 , ǫ 2 , ǫ 1,2 > 0, there exists a sequence of (2 nR0 , 2 nR1 , 2 nR2 , n)-codes for which
≤ η and the equivocation rates R 1e and R 2e satisfy
The two conditions on W 1 arise because the equivocation rate depends on which destination W 1 is sent to, as can be seen below in (6d). Recall from the model of the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets that W 1 is sent to both Y 1 and Y 2 . The first equivocation rate in (5a) corresponds to W 1 being sent to receiver Y 2 and the second equivocation rate in (5a) corresponds to W 1 being sent to receiver Y 1 . The rate-equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets is the closure of the set of all rate-tuples such that
is achievable. Our analysis does not include the case of perfect secrecy (i.e., the rate region with R 1e = R 1 and R 2e = R 2 ). The following theorems summarize the main results of this paper.
Theorem 1:
An inner bound to the rate-equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets is the closure of all rate-tuples (R 0 , R 1 , R 1e , R 2 , R 2e ) satisfying
in which R ′ 1 I(U 2 ; Y 3 |U 1 ) and R ′ 2 I(X; Y 3 |U 2 ) are defined over the the probability density function (p.d.f.)
which is induced by the coding scheme. In addition, we require that the condition
is met. From the p.d.f. (7), the auxiliary random variables U 1 , U 2 and U 3 satisfy the Markov chain conditions
Proof: The proof of achievability is based on that for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets in [10] , [11] which uses Marton's achievability scheme [13] combined with superposition coding and is given in Section IV-A with the equivocation calculation (bounds for R e1 , R e2 ) to be presented in Section IV-C.
Since our achievability scheme is based upon that of [10] , [11] , it is natural that the inner bound is the same as that of [10] , [11] , but with the addition of the equivocation rates. In fact it will be the same as [12] , with the addition of the equivocation rates. As a check, setting Y 1 = Y 3 in (6d)-(6f), R 1e ≤ 0, R 2e ≤ 0 and R 1e +R 2e ≤ 0, so no secrecy rate is possible. Thus the equivocation rates (6d)-(6f) are achievable.
Theorem 2:
An outer bound to the rate-equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets, where Y 1 is more capable than Y 3 , is the closure of all rate-tuples (R 0 , R 1 , R 1e , R 2 , R 2e ) that satisfies
Proof: The proof for this outer bound is given in Section V-A.
We see that the equivocation rates for (R 1e , R 2e ) in the inner and outer bounds in Theorems 1 and 2 match. Note that the equivocation rate for R 1e received at Y 1 is reduced by
In ∆ 1 , the first term is needed to protect the codewords generated by Marton's achievability scheme, and the second term protects codewords generated by superposition coding. While it is only required to protect the codewords generated by Marton's achievability scheme for the general 2-receiver BC in [5] , our secure scheme (to be presented in Section IV) does this, as well as protects the additional codewords generated by superposition coding. Hence, our secure scheme results in a loss for R 1e (compared to R 1 ) that may be larger than expected.
It is also noted that by removing the secrecy constraints from the outer bound to the rate-equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets, we can obtain a new outer bound to the capacity region of the general 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets without secrecy. We see this by setting R 1e = 0 and R 2e = 0 in Theorem 2 above. Since the restriction that receiver Y 1 is more capable than receiver Y 3 is only applicable when deriving R 1e and R 2e as will be shown in Section V-A, removing the secrecy constraints will
give us the outer bound to the capacity region of the general 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets.
Theorem 3:
An outer bound to the capacity region for the general 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets is the closure of all rate-tuples (R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
Proof: As described above.
B. The 3-Receiver BC with 2 Degraded Message Sets
The 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets with secrecy constraints can be specialized to 2 classes of a 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets with secrecy constraints: We note that the inner and outer bounds do not match for the first case, but match for the second case under the condition that both receivers Y 1 and Y 2 are less noisy than receiver Y 3 .
We have studied the Type 1 channel in [14] . In this paper, we shall briefly review the achievability scheme for secrecy constraints to see the differences from the 3 degraded message sets case, and show that the outer bound for the 3 degraded message sets case can be reduced to the outer bound for this Type 1 channel.
For the Type 2 channel, we shall show that the bounds on the rate-equivocation region can be specialized from the 3 degraded message sets case. We also note that the Type 2 channel is a special case of the inner bound to the rate-equivocation region for a 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets studied in Chia and El Gamal [9] using a different coding scheme. In [9] , the message reception and secrecy conditions are the same as the Type 2 channel. Thus, both our bounds and that of [9] will reduce to the Type 2 channel. Also, our outer bounds will reduce to the Type 2 channel under the conditions that both receivers Y 1 and Y 2 are less noisy than receiver Y 3 .
We state the inner and outer bounds to the rate-equivocation region for the Type 1 channel in Corollaries 1 and 2, and the rate-equivocation region for the Type 2 channel in Corollary 3.
Corollary 1:
An inner bound to the rate-equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 1) is the closure of all rate-tuples (R 0 , R 1 , R 1e ) satisfying
under the same Markov chain conditions (9) for the auxiliary random variables, where
, and the conditions
are satisfied.
Proof: See Section IV-B for the achievability proof, and [14] for the equivocation calculation.
We see that ∆ 2 in Corollary 2 may be expressed as
which is ≥ I(X; Y 3 |U 3 ). Thus, as a check, when Y 1 = Y 3 in (12c), R 1e ≤ 0, so no secrecy rate is possible and therefore the equivocation rate (12c) is achievable. Also, when compared to the equivocation rates on R 1e for the 3 degraded message sets channel in (6d), a smaller rate is achievable for W 1 sent to Y 1 . Then, by the virtue of sending W 2 to Y 1 , the coding scheme of [10] , [11] is able to give a higher equivocation rate for W 1 sent to Y 1 .
It appears that by sending more messages to receiver Y 1 , then the achievable equivocation rates can be increased.
The lower achievable rate for W 1 sent to Y 1 for the 2 degraded message sets (Type 1) channel is due to the fact that the achievable coding scheme protects all the codewords generated by superposition coding. We note that the coding scheme of [10, 11] generates codewords giving rise to the rates
and R 1 ≤ I(X; Y 1 |U 1 ). From the fact that when Y 1 = Y 3 in (12c), R 1e ≤ 0 for both choices of R 1e , so implying the equivocation rates (12c) are achievable, we see that our proposed secure scheme is able to protect all the codewords generated by superposition coding, but with a smaller achievable equivocation rate for W 1 sent to Y 1 compared to R 1e (with W 1 sent to Y 1 ) for the 3 degraded message sets channel.
The outer bound for the Type 1 3-receiver 2 degraded message sets BC is stated as follows.
Corollary 2:
An outer bound to the rate-equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 1), where Y 1 is more capable than Y 3 , is the closure of all rate-tuples (R 0 , R 1 , R 1e ) satisfying
Proof: See Section V-B.
We state the rate-equivocation region for the Type 2 3-receiver 2 degraded message sets BC below.
Corollary 3:
The secrecy capacity region for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 2) for the case where Y 1 and Y 2 are both less noisy than Y 3 is the closure of all rate-tuples (R 0 , R 1 , R 1e ) satisfying
Proof: In this channel class, the inner and outer bounds match. The proof of achievability follows by using code partitioning for security, as in [1, 2] , where it can be seen that the codeword X is protected by the partition of I(X; Y 3 |U ). The rate-equivocation region is achievable by setting
in Theorems 1 and 2 and using the conditions that Y 1 and Y 2 are less noisy than Y 3 . Therefore, we have the
It is worth emphasizing here that this channel class is more general than the special case of the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 1) under the condition that Y 1 is less noisy than Y 3 in [14] , since Y 2 receives W 1 here but this is not the case in [14] . 
IV. INNER BOUND FOR THE 3-RECEIVER BC WITH 3 DEGRADED MESSAGE SETS
A. Proof of Achievability for 3-Receiver BC with 3 Degraded Message Sets
Our achievability proof for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets is an alternative version of the one in [11, Appendix III] . We use Wyner's code partitioning [2] with the double-binning scheme of [3] to provide secrecy, together with the coding scheme for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets in [10, 11] .
The scheme of [10] , [11] represents W 0 by U 1 , then breaks W 2 into 2 parts. The first part is combined with U 1 by superposition coding to generate U 3 . The message W 1 is combined with U 1 by superposition coding to generate U 2 . U 2 and U 3 are partitioned into bins and the product bin containing the joint typical pair (achievable by Marton's coding scheme) is combined with the second part of W 2 by superposition coding to obtain X.
At the receivers, Y 1 decodes U 1 , U 2 , U 3 , and X to recover the messages W 0 , W 1 and W 2 , while Y 2 decodes U 1 and U 2 to recover messages W 0 and W 1 and Y 3 decodes U 1 indirectly using U 3 to recover W 0 . In our secure scheme, the codewords U 2 and X are, respectively, protected from receiver Y 3 (i.e., the wiretapper) by a one-sided double-binning and code partitioning. This is depicted in Figure 4 .
Suppose that we have the p.d.f. in (7) which induces the Markov chain conditions
The following describes the encoding and decoding processes.
Codebook generation:
, and R 2e = P 3 + P 1e . Define, for security,
where δ 1 > 0 and is small for n sufficiently large.
First of all, generate 2 nR0 sequences U 1 (w 0 ), for w 0 ∈ W 0 , randomly and uniformly from the set of typical U 1 sequences. For each U 1 (w 0 ), generate 2 nQ2 sequences U 2 (w 0 , q 2 ) randomly and uniformly from the set of conditionally typical U 2 sequences, and also 2 nQ3 sequences U 3 (w 0 , q 3 ) randomly and uniformly from the set of conditionally typical U 3 sequences. Next, randomly partition the sequences, U 2 (w 0 , q 2 ), into 2 nR1 equally-sized bins, and the sequences, U 3 (w 0 , q 3 ), into 2 nP3 equally-sized bins. The U 2 codewords undergo a double partition:
the first into 2 nR1e bins, and the second further partitions them into 2 nR Each product bin (
probability under the conditions [16] 
Now let us rewrite the joint typical pair as (u 2 (w 0 , w 1 , w ′ 1 ), u 3 (w 0 , p 3 )). For each such pair corresponding to the product bin ( Encoding: To send (w 0 , w 1 , w 2 ), express w 2 by (p 1 , p 3 ) and send the codeword
. Decoding: Use T n ǫ (P Z ) to denote the set of jointly strong typical n-sequence with respect to the p.d.f. p(z). Without loss of generality, assume that (w 0 , w 1 , p 3 , p 1 ) = (1, 1, 1, 1) is sent and w ′ 1 and p ′ 1 can be arbitrary. The receivers decode as follows: 1) Receiver 1 uses joint typical decoding of {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x, y 1 } to find the indices (w 0 , w 1 , p 3 , p 1 ).
2) Receiver 2 uses indirect decoding of u 2 [10] to find the index w 0 . Once this is known, u 1 is also found.
Then, receiver 2 uses joint typical decoding of {u 1 , u 2 , y 2 } to find w 1 .
3) Receiver 3 uses indirect decoding of u 3 to find the index w 0 .
At receiver 1, the decoder seeks the indices (w 0 , w 1 , p 3 , p 1 ) so that
If there is none or more than one possible codeword, an error is declared. The possible error events are as follows:
are not jointly typical with y. By the properties of strong typical sequences [17] , Pr{E 1 } ≤ ǫ ′ , where ǫ ′ → 0 for large n.
b) E 2 : w 0 = 1 and arbitrary w 1 , p 3 , p 1 , with u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x jointly typical with y 1 . Then, we have
where δ → 0 as ǫ → 0 for n sufficiently large. For Pr{E 2 } ≤ ǫ ′ , we require
since
c) E 3 : w 0 = 1, w 1 = 1 and arbitrary p 3 , p 1 , with u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x jointly typical with y 1 . Then, we have
For Pr{E 3 } ≤ ǫ ′ , we require
where the second line is due to
d) E 4 : w 0 = 1, w 1 = 1, p 3 = 1 and arbitrary p 1 , with u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x jointly typical with y 1 . Then, we have
For Pr{E 4 } ≤ ǫ ′ , we require
where the first term in (a) is due to U 1 → U 2 → X → Y 1 and the second term is due to
x jointly typical with y 1 . Then, we have
For Pr{E 5 } ≤ ǫ ′ , we require
where the equality is due to
e) E 6 : w 0 = 1, w 1 = 1, p 3 = 1 and p 1 arbitrary with u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x jointly typical with y 1 . Then, we have
For Pr{E 6 } ≤ ǫ ′ , we require
where the first term of (a) is due to U 1 → U 3 → X → Y 1 and the second term of (a) and (b) are due to
Consequently, under the conditions (21), (24), (26), (28), (30) listed above, the error probability at receiver 1 is less than
Pr{E i } ≤ 6ǫ ′ . Now, assume that (w 0 , q 2 ) = (1, 1) is sent to receiver 2. At receiver 2, the decoder first finds w 0 by indirect decoding, then finds w 1 by joint typical decoding. The error events at receiver 2 may be divided into:
is not jointly typical with y 2 (indirect decoding). In this case, by the properties of strong typical sequences, we have Pr{E ′ 1 } ≤ ǫ ′ .
b) E ′ 2 : w 0 = 1, q 2 arbitrary and u 2 is jointly typical with y 2 (indirect decoding). This is the same as receiver 2 trying to estimate w 0 such that (u 2 (w 0 , q 2 ), y 3 ) ∈ T n ǫ (P U2Y2 ) for any q 2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2 nQ2 }. We have
c) E ′ 3 : w 0 = 1, q 2 = 1, and u 1 , u 2 are jointly typical with y 2 . Then, we have
Then, for Pr{E ′ 2 } ≤ ǫ ′ , we need
Thus, under the conditions (32) and (34), the error probability at receiver 2 is less than
At receiver 3, indirect decoding is used, so that the decoder estimates w 0 such that (u 3 (w 0 , q 3 ), y 3 ) ∈ T n ǫ (P U3Y3 ) for any q 3 ∈ {1, . . . , 2 nQ3 }. Assuming that (w 0 , q 3 ) = (1, 1) is sent, we require
for the error probability at receiver 3 to be small for n sufficiently large.
In addition to the decoding conditions above, we require that
which is a consequence of setting P ′ 1 = I(X; Y 1 |U 2 ) − δ 1 as the partition size. Combining (18), (21), (24), (26), (28), (30), (32), (34), (35) and (36) using Fourier-Motzkin elimination with
we can obtain the inner bound to the secrecy capacity region in Theorem 1 as well as condition (8), which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Achievability for 3-Receiver BC with 2 Degraded Message Sets (Type 1)
Here, we outline the proof of achievability for the Type 1 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets and secrecy constraints. The coding scheme largely follows that for the 3 degraded message sets case, but with the key difference being the assignment of the message W 1 using the auxiliary codewords. Specifically, instead of encoding W 1 using the auxiliary codeword U 2 and W 2 using U 3 and X as in the 3 degraded message sets case, here, W 1 is encoded using U 2 , U 3 and X. We can use the same code partitions and sizes of the partitions for security as in the 3 degraded message sets case, even for this different coding scheme.
Codebook generation: Let us define
The code generation follows the same way as in Section IV-A, except that we randomly partition the sequences, U 2 (w 0 , q 2 ), into 2 nP2 equally-sized bins, and U 3 (w 0 , q 3 ), into 2 nP3 equally-sized bins, whereP 2 = P 2e +P ′ 2 +P † 2
The U 2 codewords undergo a double partition while U 3 undergo a single partition. Then, for each product bin (p 2 , p 3 ) contains the joint typical pair
} with high probability
As before, for each joint typical pair Encoding: To send (w 0 , w 1 ), express w 1 by (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) and send the codeword x(w 0 , p 1 1, 1, 1 ) is sent and p ′ 1 , p ′ 2 can be arbitrary. The receivers decode the messages as follows: 1) Receiver 1 uses joint typical decoding of {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x, y 1 } to find the indices (w 0 , p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ).
2) Receiver 2 uses indirect decoding of u 2 to find the index w 0 .
At receiver 1, the decoder seeks the message so that
The error events at receiver 1 can be classified into:
are not jointly typical with y 1 . In this case, we have Pr{E 1 } ≤ ǫ → 0 for large n.
b) E 2 : w 0 = 1, with arbitrary p 1 , p 2 and p 3 , but u 1 , u 2 , u 3 and x are jointly typical with y 1 . For Pr{E 2 } ≤ ǫ → 0 with n sufficiently large to be true, we then need
c) E 3 : w 0 = 1, p 2 , p 3 = 1, and p 1 arbitrary, but u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x are jointly typical with y 1 . For Pr{E 3 } ≤ ǫ → 0 with n sufficiently large to be true, we require
d) E 4 : w 0 = 1, p 2 = 1, p 3 = 1, and p 1 arbitrary, but u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x are jointly typical with y 1 . Then, for Pr{E 4 } ≤ ǫ → 0 with n sufficiently large to be true, we need
e) E 5 : w 0 = 1, p 2 = 1, p 3 = 1, and p 1 arbitrary, but u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x are jointly typical with y 1 . Then, for
Pr{E 5 } ≤ ǫ → 0 with n sufficiently large to be true, we need
f) E 6 : w 0 = 1, p 2 = 1, p 3 = 1 and p 1 = 1, but u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x are jointly typical with y 1 . Then, for Pr{E 6 } ≤ ǫ → 0 with n sufficiently large to be true, we require
The error probability at receiver 1 is therefore less than
. At receivers 2 and 3, assuming that (w 0 , q 2 ) = (w 0 , q 3 ) = (1, 1) is sent, we require
for the error probabilities tending to 0 for n sufficiently large. We additionally have
which is a consequence of setting P ′ 1 = I(X; Y 1 |U 2 ) − δ 1 as the partition size. Combining (38) and (40) to (45) and (46) by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination with R 1 = R 1e + R ′ 1 , R 1e = P 1e + P 2e + P 3 , we can obtain the rate region in Theorem 2 and the conditions (13).
C. Equivocation Calculation for 3-Receiver BC with 3 Degraded Message Sets
In this section, we show that the equivocation rate for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets satisfies the security conditions in (5) . That is, we shall derive the bounds for
In the analysis, we shall make use of the following relation very frequently
For the message W 1 , the equivocation can be bounded in two ways, which respectively correspond to whether U 2 is the codeword sent to Y 2 or X is the codeword sent to Y 1 . For the former case, we have
where (a) is by (47), and (b) has first two terms by (47). Now, we can bound each term in (48) separately. For the first term, given u 1 , U 2 has 2 nI(U2;Y2|U1) codewords with equal probability. As such,
where δ ′ 1 > 0 and is small for n sufficiently large. The second term can be bounded by [3] 
where δ ′ > 0 and is small for n sufficiently large. For the third term, by Fano's inequality, we have
where ǫ ′ 2,n → 0 for n sufficiently large. To show that λ(w ′ 1 ) ≤ 2κ where κ → 0 for n sufficiently large so that (51) holds, consider decoding at the wiretapper and the codebook with rate R ′ 1 to be decoded at the wiretapper with error probability λ(w ′ 1 ). Let W 1 = w 1 and W 0 = w 0 be fixed. We note that the wiretapper decodes U 2 first as it will then use this knowledge to decode X later. The wiretapper decodes U 2 given W 1 = w 1 and U 1 = u 1 , by finding the index w ′ 1 , so that
If there is none or more than one possible codeword, an error is declared. Now, define the event
Then, assuming that u 2 (w 0 , w 1 , 1) is sent,
where δ → 0 as ǫ → 0 for n sufficiently large. Thus, since we have chosen R ′ 1 = I(U 2 ; Y 3 |U 1 ) − δ 1 for the double-binning partition, we get λ(w ′ 1 ) ≤ 2κ for δ 1 > 2δ and (51) holds. Substituting (49)-(51) into (48), we
,n , and hence the equivocation rate satisfies the first condition in (5a).
For message W 1 sent using X to Y 1 , we have
For the first term in (55), given u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , X has 2 nI(X;Y1|U2,U3,U1) codewords with equal probability. Then,
The last equalities are due to
where the above equalities are due to the Markov chain conditions (9) . Thus, for this case, we choose
The second term in (55) can be bounded as
The third term in (55) may be bounded using Fano's inequality as in (51). The fourth term can also be bounded using Fano's inequality, by which we have
where ǫ ′ 1,n → 0 for n sufficiently large. To show that λ(p ′ 1 ) ≤ 2κ so that (61) holds, assume that wiretapper Y 3 knows U 2 = u 2 , U 1 = u 1 and decodes x(w 0 , w 1 , w ′ 1 , p 3 , p 1 , p ′ 1 ) by finding the index p ′ 1 , so that
If there is none or more than one possible codeword, an error is declared. Define the event
where w 0 , w 1 , w ′ 1 are known. Assuming that x(w 0 , w 1 , w ′ 1 , p 3 , p 1 , 1) is sent, we then have
where δ → 0 as ǫ → 0 for n sufficiently large. Since we have chosen P ′ 1 = I(X; Y 3 |U 2 )−δ 1 , we obtain λ(p ′
,n is small for n sufficiently large, so the second condition in (5a) is satisfied. For the message W 2 , the equivocation can be bounded by
For the first term in (65), given u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , X has 2 nI(X;Y1|U2,U3,U1) codewords with equal probability. Thus,
as discussed in the obtaining of (56). The second term is bounded by
where ǫ ′ 3,n → 0 for n sufficiently large. To show that λ(p ′ 1 ) ≤ 2κ so that (68) holds, since the wiretapper knows W 2 , we can assume that wiretapper
where w 0 , w 1 , w ′ 1 , p 3 are known. Assuming that x(w 0 , w 1 , w ′ 1 , p 3 , p 1 , 1) is sent, we then have
where δ → 0 as ǫ → 0 for n sufficiently large. Since we have chosen
we obtain λ(p ′ 1 ) ≤ 2κ for δ 1 > 2δ and (68) holds. Substituting (66), (67) and (68) into (65), we have H(W 2 |Y 3 ) ≥ nR 2e − nǫ 2 , where ǫ 2 = δ ′ 1 + δ ′ + ǫ ′ 3,n , and the equivocation rate satisfies (5b). For the combined message (W 1 , W 2 ), we have
For the first term, we have
The second term can be bounded by
The fourth and fifth terms are, respectively,
Substituting the above into (73), we get
where
n , thus satisfying (5c). As a result, we see that the security conditions in (5) are satisfied and we have shown that the rate-equivocation tuple (R 0 , R 1 , R 1e , R 2 , R 2e ) is achievable.
V. OUTER BOUNDS FOR THE 3-RECEIVER BC WITH DEGRADED MESSAGE SETS
In the derivation of the outer bounds, we note that, for the original Markov chain conditions
which arise from the code generation for the 3-receiver BC, there exists the set of conditions
which come about by inserting auxiliary random variableŨ 2 between U 1 and U 2 in the code generation, so that
The code generation and decoding conditions are equivalent for the following:
1) For the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets, letŨ 2 represent information about W 0 , and set U 2 = U 1 for equivalent code generation and decoding conditions under (79) and (80); 2) For the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets, letŨ 2 represent information about W 1 , and set U 2 = U 2 for equivalent code generation and decoding conditions under both (79) and (80); 3) For the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 1), letŨ 2 represent information about W 1 , and setŨ 2 = U 1 for equivalent code generation and decoding conditions under (79) and (80).
We will show that case (1) is true in the Appendix of this paper, while cases (2) and (3) are shown to be true
So, to obtain the outer bound to the rate equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets, we first find the outer bound R ′ O for the 3-receiver BC using conditions (80). Then we setŨ 2 = U 1 (as in case (1)) to obtain the outer bound to the rate equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets R O with original conditions (79).
For the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 1), we use the same procedure.
A. Proof for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets
In this section we show the proof for the outer bound in Theorem 2. We use a (2 nR0 , 2 nR1 , 2 nR2 , n)-code with error probability P (n) e with the code construction so that we have the Markov chain condition
By Fano's inequality, we have
→ 0 ∀k. Now we want to define the auxiliary random variables U 1,i ,Ũ 2,i , U 2,i , U 3,i , satisfying the conditions
for all i. When we have derived the outer bounds for the rates for conditions (83), we can then setŨ 2,i = U 1,i to obtain the rates for the original conditions
Here, however, we will define the auxiliary random variables
3 ) which satisfy the conditions
for all i, which are weaker than and included in conditions (83). By settingŨ 2,i = U 1,i in (85), we still obtain the original conditions (84). Thus we use (85) in our subsequent derivation for the outer bound.
We first prove three relations which are a consequence of (85).
Proof: For any Y k,i , k = 1, 2, 3, we have
where (a) is due to
3 ) = I(U 2,i ; Y k,i |U 3,i ) = 0 by (85a) and (b) is due to the fact that
We begin by proving the outer bounds to the equivocation rates. For R 1e , we have two possible choices corresponding to whether X is sent to Y 1 or U 2 is sent to Y 2 . For the first case, we have
where (a) is by Fano's inequality. Expanding the first two terms of (a) by the chain rule, we obtain
Now we have
The terms under the summation can be bounded by
where (a) has last term by [1, Lemma 7] so that
3 )] ≥ 0 by the fact that Y 1 is a more capable channel than Y 3 along with the fact that it may be verified using a functional dependency graph [17] that
) forms a Markov chain, so the more capable channel condition is satisfied [15] ; (c) is because
where the second equality is obtained using the relation W 1 → X i → Y i on the second term on the right-hand-side,
(e) has the first term in the square brackets by the fact that
is independent of Y 3,i as may be seen using a functional dependency graph, and the second term in the square
1 ) by Relation 1; and (f) is by substitutingŨ 2,i = U 1,i . Then, we have
Next consider the rate for W 1 sent to receiver Y 2 . We have, following (89),
where (a) is by Fano's inequality. For the first two terms in (95), we have
where (a) has the last two terms by [1, Lemma 7] which gives 
and (e) is by I(Ỹ 
For the equivocation rate R 2e , we consider W 2 sent to receiver Y 1 using codeword X. Following the same procedure to obtain (89), we get
by Fano's inequality. Expanding the first two terms of the inequality above by the chain rule and following the same procedure as for R 1e in (90a), (90b) to (91), we obtain
The terms under the summation can be bounded as
where (a) is by [1, Lemma 7] so that
) forms a Markov chain so satisfying the more capable channel condition, and (d) is due to firstly,
which is true since, given
is independent of Y 3,i as can be verified using a functional dependency graph, and by
1 ) for k = 1, 3 from Relation 2. Then, we shall have
For the rates (R 1e + R 2e ), consider the combined message (W 1 , W 2 ) sent to receiver Y 1 using codeword X.
It can be shown that
where (a) results in following the steps in (89) 
where (a) is due to Y 1 being a more capable channel than
as may be verified using a functional dependency graph; (b) is due to, first, that
since in the second term in the second equality is obtained using the relation
is independent of Y 1,i , secondly, we can obtain
3 , X i ) = 0 in a similar way, and thirdly we have, by Relation 1,
We now prove the rates for R 0 , R 0 + R 1 , R 0 + R 2 and R 0 + R 1 + R 2 . For rate R 0 , we have
We also have
where (a) is by [1, Lemma 7] from which
). For the rates (R 0 + R 1 ), we consider the following cases when the messages are sent:
2) Case 2:
3) Case 3: W 0 , W 1 both sent to Y 2 .
For Case 1, we have
where (a) is by expanding using the chain rule and using Fano's inequality. Then, on combining with H(W 0 ) using (109), we can get
and, combining with H(W 0 ) using (111), we obtain
For Case 2, we similarly have
where (a) has the last term in the sum by [1, Lemma 7] giving 
Combining with H(W 0 ) using (109) and (111), we obtain
For Case 3 we have
where (a) is by Fano's inequality, and (b) has second term in the sum by [1, Lemma 7] .
For rates (R 0 + R 2 ) consider message W 2 sent to receiver Y 1 and W 0 sent to either Y 1 or Y 3 . To begin, we
where (a) is by Fano's inequality; (b) is by the independence of W 1 and
by Relation 2; and (e) is because
with the second term in the second equality being due to W 1 → X i → Y 1,i . Combine the results with H(W 0 ) in two ways. Firstly, we do this by combining with (110) using (120) to get
Next combine with (111) using (119) to get
where (a) is by
with the inequality obtained using (85a).
Lastly, for the rates (R 0 + R 1 + R 2 ), consider the following combinations of messages sent to the receivers:
where (a) is by W 1 → X i → Y 1,i . Then combining with (109), we have
Combining (125) with (111), we have
For Case 2 we have
where (a) is by 
Next combine (111) with (128), so that
where (a) is by W 2 → X i → Y 1,i ; and (b) is by following the steps in (118) for the first term in the sum of (132) and the steps from (119)-(120) for the second term in the sum of (132).
Finally, introduce random variable G, which is independent of all other random variables and taking on values i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, with probability 1/n. Define
can obtain the rate region in Theorem 2 using (94), (99), (104), (108), (110), (112), (113), (114), (116), (117), (118), (122), (123), (126), (127), (130), (131) and (133).
B. Proof of the outer bound for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 1)
In this section we show the proof for the outer bound of Corollary 2. The same code construction as in Section V-A, and preserve the definitions for the auxiliary random variables.
We begin with the equivocation rate R 1e . Following the same procedure to obtain (89) -(91), we have
where (a) is due to [1, Lemma 7] which gives
(b) is due to the fact that Y 1 is a more capable channel than Y 3 so that I(
) forms a Markov chain so that the more capable channel condition is satisfied; (c) is because
are both independent of Y 1,i from a functional dependency graph, and we also
has second term in the sum by [1, Lemma 7] by which we have
and third term by
is independent of Y 3,i ; (e) is by Relation 1; and (f) is by substitutingŨ 2,i = U 1,i .
For rates R 0 we already have, from (110) 
with the first equality due to [1, Lemma 7] , the second and third equalities by Relations 1 and 2, respectively;
1 ) = 0 by Relation 3 and (85b).
So we have
For rates R 0 + R 1 , consider W 0 sent to Y 1 , Y 2 , Y 3 and W 1 to Y 1 only. We have
where (a) is by (140) with (137), (138), (139), respectively, we can get
Now introduce the random variables G, X, Y k , k = 1, 2, 3, and U k , k = 1, 2 as at the end of Section V-A, and using (134) In this section we show the converse proof for the bound in Corollary 3. We now use a (2 nR0 , 2 nR1 , n)-code with error probability P (n) e and code construction so that we have the Markov chain condition (W 0 , W 1 )
We first note that from the definition of more capable and less noisy channels [15] , when Y 1 is less noisy than Y 2 or Y 3 , then it also follows that Y 1 is more capable than Y 2 or Y 3 .
We now also define the new auxiliary random variable
3 ) satisfying the condition
To proceed with the proof, we begin with the equivocation rates. We will consider 2 cases: the first, where 
Then the first two terms of (146) can be bounded as
3 ) ≥ 0 as Y 1 is more capable than Y 3 which is a consequence of the assumption that Y 1 is less noisy than Y 3 , with
are both independent of Y 3,i given X i , both of which can be verified using a functional dependency graph; (d) has first term by [1, Lemma 7] from which
is independent of Y 1,i given X i from a functional dependency graph; and (f) is due to
3 ) ≥ 0 from the fact that Y 1 is less noisy than Y 3 . Thus we have
For rate R 1e arising from W 1 sent to Y 2 , we follow the same procedure as in (146) to (148), except that all terms involving Y 1 are replaced with the corresponding terms involving Y 2 , and carry out the expansion
1 ) instead, and the condition that Y 2 is less noisy than Y 3 is used. Then we can get
The rate R 0 may be easily found as
For rates R 0 + R 1 , first consider W 1 sent to receiver Y 1 . We have
and (c) is because
is independent of Y 1,i given X i from a functional dependency graph.
Next, for W 1 sent to Y 2 , again follow the same procedure as to obtain (151), except that all terms involving (153) and (154), we obtain the rate region in Corollary 3.
Thus we have shown that the outer bound for this 3-receiver, 2 degraded message set (Type 2) channel is a specialization of the more general 3-receiver, 3 degraded message set channel. We note that the outer bound to the rate equivocation region in Corollary 3 also coincides with a special case of the achievable bound of Chia and El Gamal [9] stated in Theorem 1 of [9] , for the same message destinations and secrecy conditions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bounds to the rate-equivocation region for the general 3-receiver BC with degraded message sets, in which receiver 3 is a wiretapper receiving the common message, are presented. This model is a more general model than the 2-receiver BCs with confidential messages with an external wiretapper, and 3-receiver degraded BCs with confidential messages. We obtain, with secrecy, new inner and outer bounds to the rate-equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets. We also obtain, without secrecy, new outer bounds to the rate region for the general 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets. Lastly, we obtain new inner and outer bounds for rate-equivocation region for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 1).
In the proof of achievability for the inner bound, we used Wyner's code partitioning combined with doublebinning for secrecy. We have shown that the proposed coding scheme can provide security for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets or 2 degraded message sets (Type 1), although the 2 degraded message set case (Type 1) will suffer a loss in the secrecy rate. The proof for the outer bound is shown for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets and 2 degraded message sets (Type 1) under the condition that receiver 1 is more capable than receiver 3 the wiretapper; and for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 2) for receivers 1 and 2 less noisy than the wiretapper. The outer bound for the 3 degraded message set case is shown to specialize to the 2 degraded message set (Type 1). Under the condition that both receivers 1 and 2 are less noisy than the wiretapper, the inner and outer bounds for the 3 degraded message case coincide and specialize to the rate-equivocation region of the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 2), and to a special case of a 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets (Type 2) which uses a different coding scheme.
APPENDIX
Here, we show that we can insert an auxiliary random variableŨ 2 , representing information about W 0 , between U 1 and U 2 , for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets. We show that the conditions for correct code generation and low probability of error for decoding are equivalent to those without insertion ofŨ 2 by setting U 2 = U 1 . Thus, by their equivalence, we shall subsequently use the code generation process with the insertion ofŨ 2 to facilitate the derivation of the outer bound.
We first note that such an insertion ofŨ 2 gives rise to the Markov chains
Codebook generation is done as follows: first, generate 2 nR0 sequences U 1 (w 0 ). Then, for each U 1 (w 0 ), generate 2 nQ2 sequencesŨ 2 (w 0 ,q 2 ) and partition them into 2 nP2 equal-sized bins, and also 2 nQ3 sequences U 3 (w 0 , q 3 ). For eachŨ 2 (w 0 ,p 2 ), generate 2 nQ2 sequences U 2 (w 0 ,p 2 , q 2 ) and partition them into 2 nR1 bins.
Also partition the U 3 (w 0 , q 3 ) into 2 nP3 equally-sized bins. Each product bin (w 1 , w ′ 1 , p 3 ) contains the joint typical pair (U 2 (w 0 ,p 2 , w 1 , w ′ 1 , w † 1 ), U 3 (w 0 , p 3 , p † 3 )) with high probability under the conditions [16] 
P 3 ≤ Q 3 , P 2 + P 3 ≤Q 2 + Q 3 − I(Ũ 2 ; U 3 |U 1 ), P 2 + R 1e + R ′ 1 + P 3 ≤Q 2 + Q 2 + Q 3 − I(U 2 ; U 3 |U 1 ).
(156)
For the joint typical pair (U 2 (w 0 ,p 2 , w 1 , w ′ 1 ), U 3 (w 0 , p 3 )) corresponding to the product bin (w 1 , w ′ 1 , p 3 ), generate 2 nP1 sequences of codewords X(w 0 ,p 2 , w 1 , w ′ 1 , p 3 , p 1 , p ′ 1 ). The decoding follows from what described in Section IV-A. Assume that (w 0 ,p 2 , w 1 , p 3 , p 1 ) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) is sent. For receiver Y 1 , joint typical decoding of {u 1 ,ũ 2 , u 2 , u 3 , y 1 } is carried out. We list the error events and the conditions that ensure low error probability when decoding, while noting that the decoding ofp 2 and w 1 is independent: 1) Pr{E 1 : (w 0 = 1)} ≤ ǫ when R 0 +P 2 + R 1e + R ′ 1 + P 1e + P ′ 1 + P 3 < I(X; Y 1 ).
2) Pr{E 2 : (w 0 = 1,p 2 = 1)} ≤ ǫ wheñ P 2 + R 1e + R ′ 1 + P 1e + P ′ 1 + P 3 < I(X; Y 1 |U 1 ).
3) Pr{E 3 : (w 0 = 1,p 2 = 1, w 1 = 1)} ≤ ǫ wheñ P 2 + R 1e + R ′ 1 + P 1e + P 
6) Pr{E 6 : (w 0 = 1,p 2 = 1, w 1 = 1, p 3 = 1, p 1 = 1)} ≤ ǫ wheñ P 2 + P 1e + P 
Receiver Y 2 finds (w 0 ,q 2 ) by indirectly decoding U 2 , and w 1 by decoding U 2 conditioned on (Ũ 2 , U 1 ). As a result, we have the conditions
Q 2 < I(U 2 ; Y 2 |Ũ 2 , U 1 ) = I(U 2 ; Y 2 |Ũ 2 ).
Receiver Y 3 finds w 0 by indirectly decoding U 3 , which has low probability of error under the condition
Compare the above conditions with the conditions for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets without insertion ofŨ 2 found in (18), (21), (24), (26), (28) giving the Markov chain conditions (155), and the conditions on decoding and code generation thus obtained are equivalent to the original conditions withŨ 2 = U 1 . As such, we can derive the outer bound in 2 steps. In the first step, we insertŨ 2 and use Markov chain conditions (155) to obtain an outer bound R ′ O which is equivalent to the one with original conditions (9) by settingŨ 2 = U 1 . Then, setŨ 2 = U 1 in R ′ O to obtain R O .
